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CHAPTER 1: GENERAL INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Introduction 
Competition and conflict between commercial and recreational fishers over shared fish 
stocks is a historic and current reality, and has been documented in all developed and 
some developing countries (Ruello and Henry 1977; Gartside 1986; Aas and Skurdal 
1996; Sumaila 1999; Kearney 2002a, b; Pitcher and Hollingworth 2002; Sumaila 2002; 
McPhee and Hundloe 2004; Arlinghaus 2005). Although recreational and commercial 
fishing sectors are often in competition to the point of conflict with other users 
(including within their own sector), apparent conflict between recreational and 
commercial fishers is currently one of the most significant issues for fisheries 
management in Australia and many other countries (West and Gordon 1994; Brayford 
1995; van Buerren et al. 1997; McPhee and Hundloe 2004; Arlinghaus 2005). Conflicts 
may be severe and expensive of management resources, regardless of whether they 
are “real” or only perceived (i.e. based on fishers’ beliefs but not substantiated) by one 
or more of the involved fishing sectors (Jacob and Schreyer 1980; Aas and Skurdal 
1996). 
 Many authors suggest conflict between recreational and commercial fishing 
sectors is increasing as contact between the sectors increases, particularly in coastal 
areas and close to population centres (Gartside 1986; Edwards 1991; Hannah and 
Smith 1993; Brayford 1995; Ramsay 1995; Scialabba 1998; O'Neill 2000; McPhee et 
al. 2002; Steffe et al. 2005b). Increasing contact between the sectors may be due to a 
number of factors including: increased population; increased recreational fishing 
participation; and improved accessibility to previously remote fishing areas (Smith 
1980; Henry 1984; Edwards 1990; van der Elst 1992; Hannah and Smith 1993; Green 
1994; West and Gordon 1994; Kearney 2001, 2002b; Williams 2002a; Sumner 2003; 
Steffe et al. 2005b). Although conflict can occur when commercial and recreational 
fishers target different species, the conflict situation is enhanced when the same 
species are targeted by both sectors (Arlinghaus 2005). 
 In an attempt to reduce contact between competing sectors and hence reduce 
conflict, sector-specific closures are introduced in previously shared areas (Samples 
1989; Department of Primary Industries and Fisheries 2003). Recreational Only Fishing 
Areas (ROFAs) (i.e. areas where commercial fishing is banned, leaving exclusive 
access to recreational fishers (anglers)) are becoming increasingly common in 
Australia and other developed countries (Owen 1981; Rogers and Gould 1995; 
Kearney 2002b; McPhee et al. 2002; Walters 2003). All States and Territories in 
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Australia have implemented ROFAs, particularly in coastal areas. For instance, in New 
South Wales (NSW) in May 2002, 30 areas along the coast became “Recreational 
Fishing Havens” (termed ROFAs here), where commercial fishing was either 
completely banned or significantly restricted. These ROFAs resulted in the closure of 
24% of the State’s estuarine waters to commercial fishing (NSW Department of 
Primary Industries 2004; Steffe et al. 2005b). In the Northern Territory, the rise of the 
recreational fishing sector in the 1980s shifted the focus of barramundi management to 
the allocation of the resource between the competing sectors. This resulted in the 
exclusion of commercial fishing from some areas including all freshwater areas, plus 
Darwin Harbour, Kakadu National Park, and the Daly, Mary and Roper Rivers (Pender 
1995; Griffin 2003). In Victoria, only 4 of 25 bays and inlets allow commercial finfish 
fishing, making the remaining areas effectively ROFAs for finfish (Murray MacDonald, 
Department of Primary Industries Victoria, pers. comm., 2006) 
 Commercial Only Fishing Areas (COFAs), on the other hand, appear extremely 
rare. There is one published example of COFAs available: in the north-western 
Mediterranean there are areas where small-scale restricted commercial net fishing is 
allowed but recreational line and spear fishing is banned. However the purpose of such 
restrictions was for conservation of fish species, rather than segregation to reduce 
conflict (Francour et al. 2001). In Western Australia, priority access (but not exclusive 
access) is given to commercial salmon fishers for a set period on southern beaches 
(Bartleet 1995). 
 Given this trend, ROFAs are the focus of the present study. In north 
Queensland, Australia, a number of estuaries have been closed to commercial netting 
(effectively making them ROFAs for finfish) to reduce conflict between recreational and 
commercial fishers competing for shared estuary fish, particularly barramundi (Lates 
calcarifer) (Mark Doohan, QDPI&F, pers. comm., 2005). Although some of these 
ROFAs have been in place since the 1970s there has been very little evaluation of their 
social and biological effects. In most cases, the extent to which ROFAs are successful 
in segregating competing sectors, and thus reducing conflict, has not been tested. 
  In addition to potentially segregating competing sectors, ROFAs also have 
additional potential benefits for the recreational sector. In particular, with the exclusion 
of commercial fishing, there is less competition for previously shared fish stocks in the 
area. Consequently, improved recreational catches are expected, producing potential 
flow-on effects of increased effort from this sector, which may lead to increased 
spending and potentially increased value to the community (Ruello and Henry 1977; 
Kearney 2001; Dominion 2002; McPhee and Hundloe 2004). While significant 
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anecdotal evidence suggests such benefits are being realised, there are few cases 
where actual catch trends and flow-on benefits are examined, and when they are the 
results are mixed.  
 The introduction of ROFAs also attracts various potential costs. Many of these 
costs will be borne by the excluded commercial sector; however there are also 
potential costs to the community and the fish stocks (Kearney 2003a; MacDonald 
2003). In practice, ROFAs are permanent – i.e. there are no published cases of ROFAs 
being reverted back to shared-access where both sectors are targeting the same 
species (McPhee and Hundloe 2004). Thus, with increasing calls for ROFAs from 
recreational fishers, and more claims for compensation for loss of commercial 
livelihood as a result, it becomes important to look at the actual costs and benefits of 
implementing ROFAs (Dominion 2002).  
 
This project examines whether the expected benefits of ROFAs – in terms of reduced 
conflict between recreational line fishers and commercial gill net fishers, and improved 
recreational catches – exist within the north Queensland barramundi fishery. In addition 
to providing an understanding of the benefits of ROFAs within this fishery, results will 
be relevant to many situations where ROFAs are being proposed or have been 
introduced with the goal of reducing conflict and/or improving recreational catches.  
  
1.2 Literature Review: The benefits and costs of Recreational Only Fishing Areas 
Sector-specific fishing closures (where one sector is excluded from an area to provide 
exclusive use of the resource to the other sector), designed to separate competing user 
groups (sectors) date back to the early 20th century (Department of Fisheries Western 
Australia 2000). Traditionally, fisheries resources were accessible to all sectors, with 
fisheries resources generally considered common property: i.e. the resources are 
owned collectively by a group and not owned by anyone (Rogers and Gould 1995; van 
der Elst et al. 1997; Marshall and Moore 2000). However, traditional ‘open access’ to 
common property resources can lead to depletion of stocks, through Hardin’s well-
known “Tragedy of the Commons” situation, where each fisher will have the incentive 
to catch as much as possible before someone else does (Smith and Pollard 1995; van 
der Elst et al. 1997; Kearney 2001). To avoid this, most fisheries are managed via 
regulation by the government or state, which allocates both commercial and 
recreational rights (Charles 1992; Rogers and Gould 1995; Marshall and Moore 2000). 
However, there is a lack of agreed processes for determining appropriate 
sharing/allocation targets for particular resources (Henry and Lyle 2003), and both the 
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commercial and recreational sectors aim to maximise their share of limited and finite 
fisheries resources, often at the expense of the other sector (Ruello and Henry 1977; 
Henry 1984; Smith and Pollard 1995).  
 Central to the problem of increasing competition between sectors is this 
question of ownership of the resource (Charles 1992; Kearney 2003a). Commercial 
rights may be regarded as a form of private property right purchased in the form of a 
transferable licence that provides a degree of ownership over the resource (Marshall 
and Moore 2000). For some commercial fisheries catch shares for each licence are 
also well-defined (Craig 2000; Kearney 2001). For recreational fisheries, although most 
anglers consider fishing to be their birthright, collectively their rights have not been 
defined (Rogers and Gould 1995; McMurran 2000; Kearney 2001; McPhee et al. 2002; 
Kearney 2003a). With increasing pressures on, and competition for, limited fish stocks 
there are increasing demands from the recreational fishing sector for greater 
recognition and definition of their rights of access (McPhee et al. 2002). With the rise of 
the recreational fishery there has been an increased political push for exclusive access 
to some areas and species (Teirney 1995; Kearney 2001; McPhee and Hundloe 2004). 
Allocation decisions such as these are unique in that the best available scientific 
information is not central to the conflict resolution (Hannah and Smith 1993).  
 Many fisheries researchers advocate sector-exclusive access/closures to areas 
as a feasible way to reduce conflict by reducing contact between competing sectors 
(e.g. Hendee 1974; Brown 1977; Owen 1981; Samples 1989; Brayford 1995; Rogers 
and Gould 1995; Taylor-Moore 1997; van der Elst 1997). For example, van der Elst 
(1997), suggested ongoing competition for King George whiting (Sillaginodes 
punctatus) in South Australia and Victoria could be resolved through sector-specific 
zonation by restricting recreational anglers to areas close to urban centres and 
allocating commercial rights beyond. 
 Other authors believe sector-specific closures are detrimental or unpopular, and 
may themselves cause conflict (Beaumariage 1978; Hannah and Smith 1993; Bennett 
et al. 2001). Resource allocation is one of the most challenging issues for fisheries 
managers (Department of Primary Industries and Fisheries 2004) and requires the 
most conflict producing decisions within fisheries management as they “pit group 
against group” (Hannah and Smith 1993). The likelihood of allocations to produce 
conflict depends on whether allocations are shared equally, or whether one sector 
gains at the expense of the other (such as in the case of sector-specific closures) 
(Hannah and Smith 1993). Conflict caused by dissatisfaction regarding allocation 
decisions can cause problems for the involved fishing sectors as well as fisheries 
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managers. Time and money spent on conflict resolution efforts (including via legal 
proceedings) can be costly (Daigle et al. 1996). 
 Regardless of these varied opinions, sector-specific closures are becoming 
increasingly common, and it is most common to exclude commercial fishing to the 
advantage of recreational fishers (anglers) – i.e. to introduce ROFAs (Pender 1995; 
McPhee et al. 2002; Rogers and Curnow 2003).  
 
There are various possible benefits and costs of providing exclusive access to 
recreational fishers through areas such as ROFAs: for recreational and commercial 
fishers, the community, and the fish stocks. Often such benefits and costs are 
hypothesised, but few cases examine whether these benefits are actually realised, and 
whether they outweigh associated costs. Where expected benefits and costs are 
examined, results are mixed.  
 Despite the extensive use of ROFAs, detailed literature searches revealed that 
few case studies outlining examples of ROFAs, both pre- and post-implementation, are 
published in peer-reviewed scientific journals. Available literature on this topic is 
dominated by internal fisheries reports, conference proceedings and other grey 
literature (perhaps because conflict resolution is often seen as a local issue (Brayford 
1995; Rogers and Gould 1995)). Consequently, available information about the 
effectiveness of ROFAs is limited. 
 
1.2.1 Benefits of ROFAs 
a) Reduction of conflict between recreational and commercial fishers 
Where there is an overlap of recreational and commercial fishing in terms of fished 
species and area, ROFAs are expected to reduce contact between competing groups 
thereby reducing or eliminating the need for direct conflict intervention (Samples 1989). 
If successful, this resolution of conflict will benefit both of the competing fishing sectors 
as well as fisheries managers. 
 There are many cases within Australia and other developed countries where 
ROFAs have been suggested and/or implemented in order to reduce competition and 
conflict between sectors (see Owen 1981; Gwynne 1995; Dominion 2002; Department 
of Primary Industries and Fisheries 2003). For example, in Western Australia (WA), 
Fisheries Adjustment Schemes were developed which aimed to reduce commercial 
effort in specific areas or fisheries where there was a high level of conflict or 
competition for the available catch, particularly between the commercial and 
recreational fishing sectors. WA’s Department of Fisheries advocated spatial 
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separation of groups, and in 1996 the WA government provided $8 million to directly 
fund the voluntary surrender of commercial fishing licences in areas where there was 
community demand for greater recreational fishing opportunities. The scheme 
successfully removed 46 licences by 1999 (at a cost of $3.2 million) from the smaller 
but often highly contentious commercial fisheries in estuaries and inshore areas 
(Department of Fisheries Western Australia 2000). There is no further published 
information available outlining whether this scheme has reduced conflict in the long-
term.  
 
The effectiveness of ROFAs in resolving conflict may depend on: 1) the cause of the 
conflict; and 2) how the ROFAs are implemented. Each of these points are discussed 
below. 
i) Causes of conflict 
In most situations the cause of conflict between recreational and commercial fishing 
sectors is the perception that stocks, or at least catches, are declining, which is 
generally attributed to the competing sector. Such conflict can come from either or both 
sectors (Henry 1984; Samples 1989; Dovers 1994; Kearney 2002a; Arlinghaus 2005). 
Apparent conflict in Australia’s Sydney Estuary in the 1980s reflected this: Anglers 
claimed that commercial gill net fishers killed many small fish, resulting in depleted fish 
stocks and poor angler catches. Commercial fishers reciprocated by claiming anglers 
also killed many undersize fish, either by deliberately keeping them or through poor 
handling prior to release (Henry 1984). Unfortunately, in most cases there is an 
absence of adequate stock and catch data, particularly for the recreational fishery, 
making such claims unresolvable as it is unknown whether they are based on 
misperceptions or reality (Dovers 1994; Presser 1994; Department of Fisheries 
Western Australia 2000; Murray-Jones and Steffe 2000; Kearney 2002a).  
 It is most common for anglers to blame commercial fishers for perceived catch 
declines (Ruello and Henry 1977; Quinn 1988; Macreadie 1992; Bartleet 1995; Gladwin 
1995; Kearney 1995a; Griffiths and Lamberth 2002; Kearney 2002a, 2003b). If conflict 
is present due to anglers’ perception of a commercial fishing impact on stocks and 
catches, the removal of commercial fishing should reduce the animosity anglers feel 
towards commercial fishers for that particular area. However, commercial fishers are 
likely to feel resentful unless there is compensation for the lost fishing area (Kearney 
2002a; Olsen 2003). In some cases compensation is available to displaced commercial 
fishers. For example, fees from newly introduced recreational fishing licences were 
used to buy-out commercial licences in Victoria, Australia. Such fees removed 52% of 
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commercial licences, and complete buy-outs were effective in some waters making 
these areas ROFAs. The buy-outs, which were voluntary and endorsed by the peak 
body for recreational fishing (Morison and McCormack 2003), may reduce conflict in 
the area that has been ongoing for many years (see Gladwin 1995; van der Elst 1997; 
Kearney 2002a). However the long-term effects of the buy-outs on both the commercial 
and recreational sectors still needs to be assessed (Morison and McCormack 2003). 
 The success of ROFAs in resolving conflict resulting from blame for catch 
declines may further depend on whether the impacts of the commercial sector on 
recreational catches are perceived or real. In many cases perceptions of recreational 
catch declines are not examined, and where there is a lack of data anecdotal claims 
take precedence (Smith and Pollard 1995; Griffin and Walters 1999). Where 
perceptions are examined, results are mixed. In some cases the impact of commercial 
fishing on angling catches is found to be real, and intervention is required. For 
example, in 1997 an experimental tuna longline fishery was initiated off South Africa. 
Due to a number of factors, the ‘bycatch’ of swordfish (Xiphias gladius) made up 70% 
of the total landed catch up to January 1999. At the same time there was a dramatic 
decline in recreational catch of swordfish. This situation, not surprisingly, led to 
considerable conflict between the two sectors, and the recreational sector strongly 
pushed for a closure of the commercial longline fishery1 (Griffiths and Lamberth 2002). 
 In many fisheries, however, catch declines are misperceived. For example, 
Sztramko et al. (1991) examined anglers’ catch rates at Long Point Bay on Lake Erie, 
Canada. Anglers were concerned about the effects of incidental catches of small-
mouth bass (Micropterus dolomieu) in commercial gill nets targeting yellow-perch 
(Perca flavescens) and were thus calling for tighter restrictions on gill netting in the 
area. Creel surveys from the area’s own angling group, however, showed an increasing 
trend in angler success rates. Thus, further restriction or banning of gill netting was not 
warranted, and the conflict was diffused. In many cases conflict results from 
misperceptions, and thus many conflicts can be resolved through education of the 
parties involved rather than via ROFAs (see Ruello and Henry 1977; Henry 1984; 
Kearney 1995b; McLeod 1995; Aas and Skurdal 1996; Griffiths and Lamberth 2002).  
  
 
                                                
1 For interest, closure of the longline fishery based on unavoidable swordfish bycatch 
was unlikely to occur at the time of publication, as foreign vessels within the fish’s 
migratory path also target the South African swordfish stock. There is no international 
limit on swordfish catch; however the South African longline fleet has been limited to a 
swordfish catch of 3500 tonnes (Griffiths and Lamberth 2002).  
 
 8  
ii) Method of implementation: 
Recreational Fishing Only Areas can be implemented in a number of ways 
including political lobbying, through a management agency decision, or via consultation 
and stakeholder involvement. Whether conflict is resolved by ROFAs appears to 
depend on how the ROFAs are implemented.  
 Many ROFAs are implemented via political lobbying. Some authors consider 
fisheries managers have dealt with allocation issues by minimising the “political 
whinge” between user groups: i.e. managers have dealt with public perception and 
made adjustment to rules as combined fishing and/or lobbying pressure has increased, 
taking the minimal action needed to satisfy the most vocal stakeholders in what are 
regarded mostly as local concerns (Brayford 1995; Rogers and Gould 1995; Walters 
and Cox 1999; Rogers and Curnow 2003).  
 Anglers have significant power when it comes to influencing political decisions 
regarding allocation of fisheries resources (Owen 1981; Hushak et al. 1986; Charles 
1992; Adams 1994; Kearney 2001; McPhee et al. 2002; Walters 2003). Australia’s 
peak national body for recreational and sport fishing, Recfish, states that in many 
reallocation scenarios, scientific considerations will be over-ridden by political decisions 
as a result of vocal and skilful political lobbying. They further state that anglers’ 
awareness of lobbying power is reflected in the common bumper-sticker “I fish and I 
vote” (Recfish 2001).  
 Apparently, calls for ROFAs are often made by only a small number of vocal 
anglers. They are however, the people to whom the government is most responsive 
(Ruello and Henry 1977; Beaumariage 1978; Henry 1984; McPhee 2001). Even the 
perception of such a political situation may increase the conflict between the groups as 
commercial fishers see the government bowing to a select group of recreational fishers 
who may not actually be representative of the recreational sector (Sutton 2006). 
 The most well known international example of recreational fishing groups’ 
political power is the Florida ‘netban’: In this case, anglers perceived inshore 
commercial net fishing as having a detrimental impact on fish stocks and mega-fauna, 
and they sought to introduce a ban on the use of entanglement nets. An active multi-
million-dollar media campaign ensued, with recreational fishing and conservation lobby 
groups arguing the nets indiscriminately killed endangered species and depleted finfish 
stocks. Despite the fact that available scientific information did not support these 
perceptions, the controversial campaign was successful in encouraging voters to 
approve a constitutional amendment in 1994 that prohibited the use of commercial 
entanglement nets in State waters, as well as other nets larger than 500 square feet in 
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nearshore and inshore waters (Renard 1995; Anderson 1999; Adams 2000; Smith et 
al. 2003). 
 While ROFAs introduced via political decisions may appear to resolve conflict 
issues in the short-term, long-term solutions need better future planning. The use and 
success of political lobbying can lead to a distrust of management, and tensions over 
shared access will likely intensify unless there is consistency in allocation decisions 
(Brayford 1995; Rogers and Gould 1995; Daigle et al. 1996; Nakaya 1998; Walters and 
Cox 1999; Recfish 2001), which is difficult where political, local scale decisions are 
involved. 
 Adjustment in resource access between groups has historically taken place 
through government intervention. However managers are beginning to realise that 
conflict over resource allocations is more likely to be resolved if the relevant 
stakeholders are involved in decision-making (Charles 1992; Gladwin 1995; Hancock 
1995; Rogers and Gould 1995; Hutton and Pitcher 1998; Department of Fisheries 
Western Australia 2000; McMurran 2000; Recfish 2001; Kearney 2002a). For example, 
recurring tensions regarding commercial netting in coastal waters in Portland Bay, 
Victoria (Australia) were resolved in the 1990s through mediation meetings involving 
recreational and commercial fishing representatives. Anglers were calling for a ban on 
commercial netting based on a perception (that was not supported by science) that 
commercial netting was depleting fish stocks and/or affecting the quality of angling. The 
issues were highly emotive, but it was recognised that this was social problem, not a 
stock conservation problem. Together with a mediator, both sectors developed a Code 
of Practice which included a “net free zone” (i.e. ROFA) in one area for times when 
recreational fishing participation was highest (i.e. Christmas holidays, during 
recreational fishing competitions and on long weekends), and a net free zone in 
another area for the whole year. The code of practice was approved by all delegates 
(Gladwin 1995).  
 
Regardless of how ROFAs are implemented, the question of whether they are 
successful in resolving conflict has yet to be answered – there are no published 
examples of ROFAs being examined post-implementation to test whether they were 
successful in reducing or resolving conflict. Conflict is often manifested via media 
articles and letters to fisheries departments (Ruello and Henry 1977; Henry 1984; 
Anderson 1999; Kearney 2002b): if such media outlining the conflict cease, then it 
could be assumed that the conflict is resolved. In many cases, however the same 
issues are raised again some years after ROFAs are implemented (or called for but 
deemed unnecessary at the time), usually with demands for further ROFAs. For 
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example, in Australia’s Northern Territory there has been a progressive implementation 
of ROFAs since the 1960s (Reed 1992; Pender 1995; Griffin 2003). Initially, 
commercial gill netting was prohibited in freshwater as a specific resource conservation 
measure. In 1978 the Mary River was closed to commercial fishing at the river mouth in 
response to declining recreational catch rates and high commercial pressure. This 
closure was extended in 1989. From 1987 the Commonwealth began progressively 
closing the Alligator Rivers in Kakadu to commercial fishing. The Daly River in 1989, 
and the Roper River in 1991 were closed to commercial netting in response to 
recreational fishing requests and in recognition of the importance of recreational fishing 
to the Northern Territory’s outdoor oriented lifestyle (Reed 1992). In 2002, the McArthur 
River was closed to commercial fishing, apparently due to lobbying efforts of the 
Amateur Fisherman’s Association of the Northern Territory (AFANT) (AFANT 2005). 
 Perhaps understandably, commercial fishers are concerned that there seems to 
be no “bottom line” when it comes to negotiations with anglers over resource allocation 
(Loveday 1995). Consequently, to reduce conflict in the long-term the implementation 
of ROFAs requires more future planning and consistency of implementation based on 
scientific knowledge, rather than via the current ‘ad-hoc’ manner (Brayford 1995; 
McLeod 1995; Rogers and Gould 1995). In many cases anglers are unaware of 
previous changes that have been made in their favour, which highlights the need to 
make such information more readily available (Ruello and Henry 1977; The 
Recreational Fishing Consultative Committee 1994). 
 
b) Improved recreational catches 
Anglers advocate the implementation of ROFAs on the presumption that such action 
will improve the quality of angling (in terms of numbers and size of certain species 
caught) (Ruello and Henry 1977; Kearney 2001; Cox et al. 2003). Such improvement in 
angling quality may increase the value current anglers place on fishing (Hendee 1974; 
Graefe and Fedler 1986). There is significant anecdotal evidence through fishing clubs 
and the media that ROFAs do result in improved catches for anglers (see Griffin 1995; 
Brown 2001; Anon 2002b; AFANT). There is at least an expectation that anglers’ 
catches will improve in ROFAs given the removal of commercial fishing effort (so that 
fish previously harvested by commercial fishers are now available to the recreational 
sector only) (Steffe et al. 2005b), however there is no scientific information to support 
claims of improved fishing quality in most cases, and therefore anecdotal claims can 
take precedence (Smith and Pollard 1995; Griffin and Walters 1999).  
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 There are a few cases where recreational catches are examined in ROFAs 
following their implementation. For example, in Iceland, anglers found a 28-35% 
increase in their catch when they effectively closed the River Hvitá mainstream to 
commercial netting from 1991. Recreational catch rates in the ‘closed’ area (i.e. ROFA) 
from 1991-2000 were compared to catch rates 10 years prior to the closure for the 
same area. The post-closure catch rates were also compared to catches in two other 
rivers that remained open to commercial fishing. Results showed significant increases 
in rod catches in the ROFA post-closure, while in the ‘open’ rivers the catches declined. 
Note that in this fishery the number of rods allowed on each river is fixed: i.e. it is not 
open access for recreational fishing (Einarsson and Gudbergsson 2003). 
 More recently, Steffe et al. (2005a) examined recreational harvest in the Tuross 
Lake estuary in NSW, which was declared a ROFA in May 2002. They compared two 
separate daytime, boat-based, recreational fishing surveys, with the first annual survey 
prior to ROFA implementation (March 1999 – Feb 2000), and the second 1.5 – 2.5 
years post-ROFA implementation (Dec 2003 – Nov 2004). They found significant 
increases in recreational fishing effort (about 25%) in the post-ROFA survey year, and 
significant increases in harvest of many recreationally important species such as dusky 
flathead and bream. Some species harvest decreased, meaning there was no 
difference by number between survey years in the total annual harvest, but there was a 
significant difference by weight (41.6%) in the annual harvest of fish, crabs and 
cephalopods. This was due to the increase in mean and median size of most species 
harvested post-ROFA implementation. Further, the proportional increases in 
recreational harvest were all much larger than the corresponding proportional change 
in fishing effort. The authors stated the changes detected may be in part attributable to 
the implementation of the ROFA and/or may be in part attributable to natural 
fluctuations in fish abundance and catchability (which can be large in an open estuary 
system). Nonetheless, the comparison between the two annual survey periods shows 
that real differences occurred in the recreational boat-based fishery in the Tuross Lake 
estuary since the implementation of the ROFA. 
 In many other fisheries, improvements in recreational catches are not evident. 
For example the Florida net ban was expected to result in improved recreational 
catches in terms of catch per unit effort (CPUE). This is not evident according to 
current publications, which some authors suggest is due to increases in recreational 
effort to the degree that total fishing mortality rates returned to previous levels 
(Anderson 1999; Adams 2000; Walters 2003). Ruello and Henry (1977) found no 
noticeable improvements in recreational catches in Australia’s Port Hacking and 
Brisbane waters despite being closed to commercial netting since the 1930s. They 
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further stated that Botany Bay, which was open to commercial fishing, was considered 
a better angling area than either of these two ROFAs, despite anecdotal claims to the 
contrary2. In the Pumicestone Passage in Queensland, O’Neill (2000) examined 
recreational catches before and after commercial fishing was banned in 1995. No 
improvements in recreational catch rates were found.  
 Unfortunately, most of the studies that do examine recreational catches in 
ROFAs lack scientific rigour, either through a lack of comparable catch data from 
before and after ROFA implementation, a lack of time series data following the ROFA, 
or a lack of replication in sites. For instance, Einarsson’s (2003) study in Iceland, while 
examining before and after closure data, was unable to provide a replicate ROFA with 
which to compare catch rates. Thus the changes in catch rates may have been a 
characteristic of the particular area. Steffe et al.’s (2005a) study provides a good 
comparison of recreational harvest pre- and post-ROFA implementation, however they 
do state that changes may be due to natural fluctuations and they recommend 
continued monitoring at intervals of about 3-5 years. Ruello and Henry’s (1977) 
observations for Port Hacking and Brisbane waters were based on anecdotal 
information from ‘experienced’ fishers. Finally, O’Neill (2000) recommended re-
examining angler catches in the Pumicestone Passage in future years as he sampled 
probably too soon since the closure to notice any potential catch improvements. O’Neill 
also noted he needed to interview twice as many anglers to have about an 80% 
confidence in detecting a 15% difference in catch rates between the before- and after-
closure periods.  
 A more scientifically rigorous study was successful in showing higher fish 
abundances in ROFAs compared with non-ROFAs, although they did not examine 
recreational catches: Halliday et al. (2001) used commercial gill net fishing techniques 
to compare estuarine catches in three ROFAs and three non-ROFAs in north 
Queensland bimonthly over two years. The study found higher abundances of large 
barramundi (over 800 mm total length) in ROFAs compared to non-ROFAs. These 
results suggest improved angler catches of large barramundi in ROFAs are possible.  
 However, many studies show that there is not a strong relationship between fish 
abundance and angler catch rates because angling success is highly variable (Ruello 
and Henry 1977; Johnson and Carpenter 1994; Anderson 1999; Pierce and Tomcko 
2003). For example, in Lake Mendota, Wisconsin, examination of 7-year creel survey 
data for the walleye (Stizostedion vitreum vitreum) fishery revealed that catch per unit 
                                                
2 Interestingly Botany Bay was declared a ROFA in 2002 (NSW Fisheries 2003) – 25 
years after Ruello and Henry’s publication. 
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effort varied independently of fish abundance (Johnson and Carpenter 1994). Further, 
the closure of the Mary River in the Northern Territory to commercial gill net fishing 
resulted in expectations of improved angling success. However, despite a rise in the 
availability of barramundi (due to commercial exclusion as well as a good wet season 
and strong recruitment), angler success rate did not change, with only 50% of parties 
landing a barramundi (Griffin and Walters 1999; Griffin 2003). With any commercial or 
recreational fishery, there are factors that affect catch rates outside of the abundance 
of fish stocks, such as the composition of fishing fleet (including number and skill level 
of fishers), method of fishing, and where and when fishing occurs (Maunder and Punt 
2004). 
 Another explanation for the lack of relationship between angler catch or 
success rate and stock abundance may be that overall recreational fishing effort 
increases as stocks increase such that an individual angler’s fishing quality doesn’t 
improve because there is higher competition between more anglers (Cox and Walters 
2002; Cox et al. 2002; Le Goffe and Salanié 2005).  
 Some authors suggest that recreational catches may improve in newly 
implemented ROFAs, but such benefits may only be realised by 10% of the 
recreational fishing population – i.e. by the more skilled anglers who catch 90% of the 
recreational harvest – rather than the average angler (Johnson and Carpenter 1994; 
Griffin and Walters 1999; McPhee and Hundloe 2004).  
 
c) Flow-on benefits for the community  
If improved angler catches are expected or perceived, ROFAs may result in greater 
recreational fishing effort (Griffin and Walters 1999; Cox and Walters 2002; Cox et al. 
2002; Pereira and Hansen 2003; Post et al. 2003; Denny and Babcock 2004). Such 
increased participation may in turn result in benefit to the community in terms of 
increased expenditure within the community (Hushak et al. 1986; Dominion 2002; 
Pereira and Hansen 2003) and potentially increased social well-being, such as health, 
social cohesion and quality of life, which result from participation in an outdoor 
recreational past-time such as fishing (Pretty et al. 2005; Cox 2006). The possibilities of 
increased effort and economic benefit are considered below. While social well-being is 
an important benefit, it is difficult to measure and few studies examine the well-being 
benefits of recreational fishing compared to other activities specifically. 
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i) Increased recreational fishing effort 
In many situations where ROFAs are introduced, an increase in recreational effort 
is expected. In NSW, for example, a rise in recreational demand is expected within the 
30 ROFAs introduced in the year 2002 (Dominion 2002; NSW Fisheries 2003; McPhee 
and Hundloe 2004). This expectation was fulfilled at least in one of the ROFAs – in the 
Tuross Lake estuary – where recreational effort (boat days) increased by about 25% 
approximately 1.5 to 2.5 years after ROFA implementation (Steffe et al. 2005a). For the 
walleye fishery in Lake Mendota, Wisconsin, angler expectations of increased catches 
due to stocking resulted in increased annual effort in the fishery (although the 
expectations were linked more to publicity than actual improvements in catch rates for 
the average angler) (Johnson and Carpenter 1994).  
 On the other hand, the relationship between angler effort and fish abundance is 
not known for most fisheries (Post et al. 2003), and some authors argue that even if 
angler catches improve, there is not a positive relationship between fish abundance (or 
catch rates) and the number of anglers (O'Neill 2000). For example, after commercial 
fishing was banned in the Northern Territory’s Mary River an increase in recreational 
fishing activity in response to improved fish stocks was expected but did not occur. In 
contrast there was a decrease in recreational fishing activity despite increases in 
available barramundi stocks. The authors concluded that while abundance of fish is the 
basic factor that determines whether or not fishing activity will occur, it is not the only 
factor (Griffin 1995; Griffin and Walters 1999).  
 There is the growing notion that non-catch related reasons are the principal 
motivation for recreational fishing (Henry 1984; Holland and Ditton 1992; Fedler and 
Ditton 1994; Vigliano et al. 2000; McPhee and Hundloe 2004), and that a certain 
amount of angler behaviour is fixed, or at least unresponsive, to catch rate (Johnson 
and Carpenter 1994). There are conflicting views on the level of importance anglers 
place on catching fish (Schramm et al. 2003): some authors state that catching a fish 
remains a primary goal of angling, meaning there must be some probability of catching 
a fish before non-catch motivations gain more importance (Hendee 1974; Graefe and 
Fedler 1986; Arlinghaus 2005); while others argue that fishing quality contributes to 
satisfaction but for most anglers it is less important than other factors such as the 
physical setting of the fishing experience and social and leisure factors (Holland and 
Ditton 1992; Fedler and Ditton 1994; Vigliano et al. 2000; Ready et al. 2005). For 
example, Responsive Management  (2004) conducted a survey in Pennsylvania, USA, 
in 1993 and 1996 to examine why anglers who bought a recreational fishing licence the 
previous year decided not to buy a licence on the year of the survey. Most anglers cited 
a loss of interest, lack of free time, work and family obligations, etc. Only 10% of 
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anglers stated the quality of fishing affected their decision of whether to fish 
(Responsive Management 2004; Ready et al. 2005). 
 Given the level of importance attributed to fishing quality may vary widely 
between individuals and individual situations, it is unknown whether an improvement in 
angling quality will result in increased recreational effort. 
  
ii) Increased economic value 
Regardless of these varied views and outcomes, if there is an increase in effort in 
a ROFA, it is theorised that expenditure of anglers in the area adjacent to the ROFA 
will increase (Hushak et al. 1986; Pereira and Hansen 2003). Expenditure of current 
anglers may also increase as anglers may place a higher value on a fishery with 
greater fishing quality (Dwyer and Bowes 1978; Cauvin 1980; Graefe and Fedler 1986). 
Some authors consider an increase in expenditure to be equivalent to an increase in 
economic ‘value’ (Nicholls and Young 2000; Young 2001; Murphy 2003), and this is a 
common argument used by anglers to promote further ROFA implementation (McPhee 
and Hundloe 2004).  
In some cases increased economic input into the community is expected. For 
example, the recently appointed NSW ROFAs are expected to result in an increase in 
expenditure on fuel, bait, supplies, fishing gear, boats, etc, resulting in an expansion in 
employment in the recreational sector. Such economic gains are expected to exceed 
those lost from the commercial fishery3 (Dominion 2002). Similarly, Mann et al. (2002) 
suggest the proposed introduction of commercial gill net fishing in a previously 
recreational only estuary in South Africa would probably not provide as much 
employment and economic gain as that generated by the recreational fishery. 
 While economic benefits are theorised, there are no published cases where 
such expectations of increased expenditure as a result of ROFA introduction in the 
adjacent community have been tested following ROFA implementation. For example 
Hushak et al. (1986) estimated the required increase in recreational effort and 
expenditure to offset commercial losses following allocation of yellow perch (Perca 
flavescens) and white bass (Morone chrysops) to the recreational fishery in Ohio’s 
portion of Lake Erie. Whether this increase would occur, however, was unknown: the 
authors stated that further research is needed to confirm the response of anglers to 
reallocations. In some situations changes to recreational effort has been examined, but 
whether related expenditure has increased as well is not explored. Some authors 
                                                
3 There are no current publications available outlining whether recreational expenditure 
has increased in areas adjacent to these NSW ROFAs as expected. 
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suggest that angler success apparently does not strongly influence angler expenditure 
(McPhee and Hundloe 2004).  
 If, hypothetically, angler expenditure does increase in the region adjacent to the 
ROFA, it may merely be a transfer or re-distribution of spending from other areas (e.g. 
other nearby towns, or other leisure activities), so the overall net national benefits 
would be zero (Edwards 1990; Hundloe 2002; Kearney 2003b; McPhee and Hundloe 
2004). This may certainly be the case in Queensland where the overall number of 
recreational fishing participants is declining (Higgs 2003), as it is in other areas (e.g. 
America (Fedler and Ditton 2001)), and thus the likelihood is low that any increased 
expenditure comes from new anglers. 
Importantly, there is also abundant literature available arguing that an increase 
in expenditure is not equivalent to an increase in ‘value’ to the community (see Gordon 
et al. 1973; Edwards 1990, 1991; Kearney 2001; Hundloe 2002; Pitcher and 
Hollingworth 2002; McPhee and Hundloe 2004). There are numerous papers debating 
the use of various economic methods for assessing economic value and allocating 
resources accordingly between recreational and commercial fishing sectors (see 
Edwards 1991; Nicholls and Young 2000; Hundloe 2002; McPhee and Hundloe 2004). 
Currently, however, there is no consistent or accepted method for evaluating 
recreational fisheries – a common problem against which Gordon et al. (1973) made a 
plea for consistency in the 1970s – much less for comparing recreational and 
commercial fishing values. Given numerous differences between these two sectors, 
values (social and/or economic) are difficult to compare (Beaumariage 1978; Coastal 
Engineering Research Center 1984; Winwood 1994; Gresswell and Liss 1995; van der 
Elst 1997; van der Elst et al. 1997; Kearney 2002b; Pitcher and Hollingworth 2002), 
and there is a lack of studies that examine the social and economic values of the 
recreational and commercial sectors at the same time and/or using the same methods 
(Holland et al. 1992; Hobson 1993; Peterson 1994; van der Elst 1997; The South 
Australian Centre for Economic Studies 1999; McPhee and Hundloe 2004). 
Furthermore, there are few data available for any method of economic evaluation or 
comparison, particularly for the recreational sector (Holland et al. 1992; McLeod 1995; 
Rogers and Gould 1995; Kearney 2001; Rogers and Curnow 2003). 
With the inability to demonstrate comparable values, it is impossible to 
demonstrate comparable costs and benefits of different allocation strategies (van der 
Elst 1997), and there is a scarcity of studies examining the net economic impacts of 
reallocating resources from the commercial to the recreational sector (Berman et al. 
1997; Sharma and Leung 2001). Therefore it is important the economic costs and 
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benefits are monitored or assessed where allocation changes are made (McPhee and 
Hundloe 2004). 
Regardless of whether economic values are available or correct, some authors 
argue that ROFAs may be “second best” in terms of economic efficiency (Edwards 
1990; McPhee and Hundloe 2004), although they may have the advantage of political 
expediency (Samples 1989; Rogers and Gould 1995). Allocation based on economic 
value infers that stocks should be allocated to the sector which gains the greatest 
marginal value from using the resource, hence maximising benefits to the community 
(Edwards 1991; Presser 1994; van der Elst et al. 1997; Department of Fisheries 
Western Australia 2000; Kearney 2002b). McPhee & Hundloe (2004) argue that if the 
purpose of reallocation is to increase community benefits, resources should be 
allocated to the point where net marginal benefits for each sector are equal, rather than 
providing one sector with exclusive access such as via ROFAs.  
  
d) Conservation of fish stocks 
Some proponents of ROFAs believe ROFAs will be able to fulfil sustainability or 
conservation goals by removing the more efficient commercial effort; the catch from 
which may not be completely harvested by recreational fishers (MacDonald 2003; 
Rogers and Curnow 2003; Denny and Babcock 2004). For instance in Iceland, 
following the closure of the River Hvitá to commercial fishing, while anglers’ catches 
improved, they were only able to harvest 39-52% of the previous commercial catch 
(Einarsson and Gudbergsson 2003), which may be a positive outcome for the fish 
stocks. This outcome, however, may differ in open access recreational fisheries (in 
Iceland there is a limit on recreational rod number per day) because recreational effort 
may continue to increase to the point that the original total harvest is taken (Cox and 
Walters 2002; Cox et al. 2002; Rogers and Curnow 2003; Walters 2003). Unfortunately 
in most cases where ROFAs are introduced the total recreational harvest from the area 
prior to and following ROFA implementation is unknown. 
 On the other hand, many authors suggest resource allocation and conservation 
issues should be treated separately, as allocating a resource to one sector does not 
necessarily address conservation imperatives (Kearney 2003a; MacDonald 2003; 
O'Regan 2003; Denny and Babcock 2004). In Western Australia, for example, there 
are calls by anglers to remove commercial fishing in an attempt to improve 
sustainability of the dhufish (Glaucosoma hebraicum) fishery. In the short-term fish 
stocks may benefit from the removal of commercial fishing and recreational catches 
would likely improve. However, current recreational bag limits are ineffective – the 
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recreational bag limit is 4 fish per person per day, but catch surveys indicate the 
average catch is 0.4 dhufish per angler per trip. Hence there is room for angler catches 
to increase within current regulations, meaning long-term benefits to the stock of 
removing commercial harvest would likely be zero as recreational effort increases in 
response to improved CPUE (Rogers and Curnow 2003). In the Tuross Lake estuary in 
NSW, there were concerns that dusky flathead were growth overfished (where 
excessive fishing effort leads to the harvesting of many smaller fish such that they do 
not get a chance to reach their maximum growth) prior to ROFA implementation. 
Surveys of recreational fishing 1.5 to 2.5 years after ROFA implementation revealed 
only a small improvement in average size of dusky flathead, indicating that the increase 
in recreational fishing effort (25%) was sufficiently large to offset most of the potential 
gain made by removing commercial fishing effort (Steffe et al. 2005a). 
 In many fisheries, though estimates are not considered reliable, the total 
recreational catches are at least as high as those of the commercial sector, particularly 
in coastal areas close to population centres (Anon 1995; Hancock 1995; Rogers and 
Gould 1995; McPhee et al. 2002; Sumner 2003). For instance recreational harvest is 
similar to commercial harvest for King George whiting, snapper, garfish, blue crabs and 
squid in South Australia (Hall 1993), barramundi on Queensland’s east coast (Williams 
2002a), and snapper in New Zealand (Sullivan 1997). In some fisheries the 
recreational catch exceeds commercial take and is seen as a major threat to the 
resource (Cox et al. 2002; Schroeder and Love 2002; Cooke and Cowx 2004), such as 
within the tailor (Pomatomus saltatrix) fishery in southern Queensland (Pollock 1979; 
Pollock 1980; Williams 2002a); red drum (Sciaenops ocellatus) in the South Atlantic 
(where recreational harvest is 93%of total harvest); and red snapper (Lutjanus 
campechanus) in the Gulf of Mexico (where recreational harvest is 58% of total 
harvest) (Coleman et al. 2004). Thus removal of commercial effort in fisheries where 
recreational harvest is dominant is unlikely to result in conservation of fish stocks. 
 In situations where recreational harvest is significant (as a proportion of total 
harvest) or where effort and catches increase dramatically as a consequence of 
declaring ROFAs, ROFAs are unlikely to be effective in meeting conservation goals 
without management intervention to limit or reduce recreational effort (and harvest). 
Some authors advocate limiting recreational effort in ROFAs through catch quota, 
limited licensing, or even limited facilities at boat ramps (Cox and Walters 2002; Mann 
et al. 2002; Cox et al. 2003; Walters 2003). However, there is often reluctance by 
fisheries managers to limit recreational access in many fisheries (Pereira and Hansen 
2003). 
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1.2.2 Costs of ROFAs 
Costs of ROFAs are not often considered when ROFAs are proposed. Some studies 
outline hypothetical costs (e.g. Dominion 2002), but fail to detail actual costs. There are 
various potential costs, not just for the excluded commercial fishers, but also for 
recreational fishers, the community and the fish stocks. There are also potentially 
significant costs to fisheries agencies and the government of implementing ROFAs. 
 
a) Costs to commercial fishers 
For the commercial sector, ROFAs bear the obvious potential cost of reduced product 
and income, due to a decrease in area available for fishing (Hushak 2000). In some 
cases there is a complete loss of livelihood from fishing if the fisher’s licence is bought 
back, such as via the ROFAs introduced recently in NSW (see Dominion 2002; NSW 
Fisheries 2003) and Victoria (see Morison and McCormack 2003). Increased pressures 
of reduced disposable income are likely to be felt both at the family and the broader 
community level (Bureau of Rural Sciences 2003).  
 Studies of Marine Protected Areas suggest costs can be significant for 
individual fishers (Bureau of Rural Sciences 2003; Cook and Heinen 2005). For 
example, the implementation of a ‘no take’ area within the Florida Keys National Marine 
Sanctuary was expected to impact  8% of shrimp catch, 14% of king mackerel catch, 
12% of lobster catch and 20% of reef-fish catch. These catch reductions would result in 
a loss of almost $844,000 in harvest revenue and 49 jobs by commercial fishing 
operations (Cook and Heinen 2005). The Representative Areas Program (RAP) 
implemented in 2004 in the Great Barrier Reef Marine Park (GBRMP), Queensland, 
was estimated to result in a $10.5 million reduction per annum in the gross value of 
production of key commercial fisheries (otter-trawl, net, line and crab), which 
represents on average approximately 10% of production value (Bureau of Rural 
Sciences 2003; Hand 2003). 
 Factors which will influence the level of impact on individual fishers include the 
magnitude of the change (i.e. the extent to which ROFA will reduce access to resource 
fishers currently use), fishers’ capacity to shift effort, change the nature of their fishing 
operations or take other mitigating action, fishers’ level of dependence on the fishery, 
their individual resilience to managing change (which varies among individuals 
depending on socio-demographic factors such as age and family structure, income, 
housing type, employment, and education, plus how localised their fishing operation is), 
and the level of compensation available. There may be a range of responses from 
fishers, including changing their fishing location (which may increase travel and running 
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costs), increasing effort to maintain production, or changing the nature of their 
operations (e.g. shifting operations to higher value outputs or to other target species). 
Some fishers may leave the fishing industries altogether (potentially with assistance 
from government buy-outs), although previous studies reveal fishers prefer to remain in 
the industry (Bureau of Rural Sciences 2003; Hand 2003; Cook and Heinen 2005).  
 In those areas where no, or insufficient, licences are bought-out from newly 
implemented ROFAs, the resulting effort shift can potentially put greater pressure on 
remaining areas and result in increased competition within the commercial sector and 
between recreational and commercial fishers in areas to which commercial effort is 
displaced (Department of Primary Industries and Fisheries 2004).  
 There are also potential social costs for affected commercial fishers and their 
families, such as those outlined following the Florida net ban. These costs included 
mental health impacts and emotional problems, higher use of drugs or alcohol, and 
higher divorce rates. These negative impacts lasted well after the  net ban was 
implemented (Anderson 1999; Bureau of Rural Sciences 2003; Smith et al. 2003). In 
NSW, social impacts including declining coastal communities and effects on family 
cohesion were hypothesised but not measured (Dominion 2002). The ability of families 
within the industry to manage can be examined in terms of a family resilience measure 
which includes socio-demographic factors such as age and family structure, income, 
housing type, employment, and education. The strong self-identification of fishers with 
their industry highlights the potential for increased feelings of alienation if commercial 
fishing options are no longer available. Many fishers have difficulty transferring to other 
employment outside the fishing sector both due to lack of formal skills and education, 
and due to cultural resistance to shifting out of the fishing sector (Bureau of Rural 
Sciences 2003; Hand 2003; Cook and Heinen 2005). There are no published cases 
where such costs have been quantified to examine whether they are outweighed by 
benefits gained from ROFAs. 
 
b) Costs to recreational fishers 
For the recreational sector, some anglers claim that the benefits of exclusive access 
may be negated by a disproportionate increase in recreational effort. As catches 
improve (perceived or real), the number of anglers may increase, leading to increased 
pressure on the resource and increasingly crowded conditions, which would be 
detrimental to angling satisfaction (Anderson 1999; Hunt 2005; Le Goffe and Salanié 
2005; Ready et al. 2005). Further, as more anglers enter the area, individual angling 
success may decrease as competition increases within the recreational fishing sector 
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(Cox et al. 2003; Arlinghaus 2005). There may also be increased conflict between 
recreational and commercial fishers in areas adjacent to ROFAs if commercial effort is 
displaced to these areas (Hancock 1995; Bureau of Rural Sciences 2003; Department 
of Primary Industries and Fisheries 2004). 
 
c) Costs to the community 
There are various potential costs to the community, depending on how central 
commercial fishing is to the community as a whole. In some cases while costs may be 
significant for individual fishers, costs may be minor for the overall community, 
depending on the proportional contribution to the community from fisheries compared 
to other industries (Bureau of Rural Sciences 2003; Cook and Heinen 2005). For 
instance, the direct economic impacts of closing a reserve within the Florida Keys 
National Marine Sanctuary to commercial fishing was expected to have significant 
impacts on affected commercial fishers, but was projected to be unnoticeable on the 
Monroe County economy. As a proportion of the Monroe County total catch, only 
1.16% of harvest revenue would be lost. Plus only 0.08% of total annual income and 
0.08% of total employment, of Monroe County would be negatively impacted (Cook and 
Heinen 2005). 
 For other communities there may be significant impacts. The introduction of the 
RAP in the GBRMP was expected to have significant impact on 13 of 20 town resource 
clusters (TRCs) along Queensland’s east coast which relied solely or heavily on the 
Marine Park for their fishing activities. Some regions will be more vulnerable than 
others as a consequence of their underlying socio-demographic characteristics such as 
dependency on the fishing industry, housing, age, labour force, occupation, weekly 
incomes, education, family structure and proportion of Indigenous persons (Bureau of 
Rural Sciences 2003). Other studies have found that fishing-related populations are 
older than average, have lower levels of education, and have been strongly associated 
with fishing employment for some time. Fishing dependent communities also generally 
have higher than average dependency ratios (ratios of young and aged people to those 
of working age). All of these factors affect a community’s ability to cope with closure to 
commercial fishing (Bureau of Rural Sciences 2003). 
 Further, commercial fishing provides local employment directly, plus 
employment in upstream and downstream industries and businesses associated with it 
(Bureau of Rural Sciences 2003). Anderson (1999), highlighted the effects of the 
Florida net ban on industries related to commercial fishing: The affected industries 
included gasoline, diesel and oil suppliers; ice, bait and fishing gear suppliers; services 
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associated with docking, registration and licences; and fish processing plants, 
warehouses and distributors. Fenton and Marshall (2000) outlined the flow-on effects of 
fisheries closures in Queensland resulting from reduced income of commercial fishers 
and predicted effects on neighbouring towns or regions where fishers would normally 
spend their income.  
 While there may be costs of economic loss to the community through a 
reduction in commercial product, some authors consider these may be offset by 
increases in recreational spending (Dominion 2002), Others dispute this theory, 
however (see Flow-on benefits for the community above). For example, in Lake Erie, 
stock increases of yellow trout were expected to result in increased recreational effort 
and expenditure; however, these expected increases did not eventuate (Hushak 2000). 
 There are also other costs to the community aside from direct economic loss 
from commercial product. For example, authors have listed positive reasons to keep 
commercial fishing in an area including local seafood and bait supply for residents and 
tourists, plus the importance to the national economy (e.g., via decreased dependence 
on imports) (Ruello and Henry 1977; Peterson 1994; Hushak 2000; Bureau of Rural 
Sciences 2003). Loss of local seafood for local and tourist consumers may also result 
in an increase in price of seafood, or forced substitution with lesser valued or imported 
species (Lampl 1989; Anderson 1999; Hushak 2000; Dominion 2002). Further, 
commercial fishing can have strong historical links in local communities, and for many 
is considered a defining industry in the livelihood and character of the region (Bureau of 
Rural Sciences 2003).  
 
d) Costs to fish stocks 
Costs to the fish stocks are also possible, though they are rarely considered or 
monitored when ROFAs are suggested or implemented. There are potential costs from 
unmonitored recreational fishing, costs to adjacent areas from displaced commercial 
effort, and potential costs for mobile species, as outlined below.  
There is a perception that the exclusion of the commercial sector may result in 
a more sustainable use of the resource (see Conservation of fish stocks above). Some 
authors and anglers argue that anglers are more conservation conscious than 
commercial fishers (Arlinghaus 2005; Grimm 2005). This is not always supported by 
the limited available data, however. Individual recreational fishers may be 
conservation-minded, but they rarely take into account the high numbers of people 
participating, which together can have a significant impact on the resource (Brayford 
1995; Francour et al. 2001; Kearney 2001; McPhee et al. 2002; Pitcher and 
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Hollingworth 2002; Schroeder and Love 2002; Kearney 2003a; Walters 2003; Coleman 
et al. 2004; Hecht and Vince 2004). Whether the potential impacts of recreational 
fishers in ROFAs outweigh the combined impacts of commercial and recreational 
fishing in shared areas is unknown. However, the potential impacts of recreational 
fishing in ROFAs are outlined here. 
 Recreational fishing can have significant impacts on fish stocks within ROFAs. 
Westera et al. (2003), for example, compared fish abundance and size between 
‘sanctuaries’ (where no fishing is allowed) and ROFAs in Ningaloo Marine Park, 
Western Australia. They examined three regions, each containing one sanctuary and 
one ROFA, and found higher abundances of legal-sized Lethrinids (the most targeted 
finfish family) in sanctuaries than in ROFAs, concluding that recreational fishing does 
have an impact on target species. Similarly, New Zealand snapper (Pagrus auratus) 
populations were compared between the Mimiwhangata Marine Park, which is open to 
some recreational fishing methods only (i.e. effectively a ROFA), to areas with no 
protection (i.e. open to all fishing) and areas with complete protection (i.e. no fishing 
allowed). The study found Mimiwhangata had fewer and smaller snapper than in any of 
the other areas, concluding that partial closures are ineffective as conservation tools. 
The authors further stated that there may be a perception that, in the absence of 
commercial fishing, fish are larger and more plentiful in the ROFA, which may result in 
higher recreational fishing effort (Denny and Babcock 2004). 
 Open-access recreational fisheries may respond to perceived or real fish 
abundance increases within ROFAs with strong effort responses that may negate any 
gains in quality of fishing for individual anglers (Sullivan 1997; Department of Fisheries 
Western Australia 2000; Cox and Walters 2002; Cox et al. 2002; Pitcher and 
Hollingworth 2002; O'Regan 2003; Walters 2003; Arlinghaus 2005; Le Goffe and 
Salanié 2005), although some authors dispute whether this will occur (see Flow-on 
benefits for the community above). Some authors state there is potential for the 
recreational sector to fish stocks to a lower level than the commercial sector would as 
anglers derive their personal incomes independent of fish resources: this means their 
fishing operations are ‘subsidised’ in an economic sense, and subsidised fisheries 
often collapse (van der Elst 1992; Hall 1993; Department of Fisheries Western 
Australia 2000; Francour et al. 2001).  
Conventional management methods, such as size and bag limits, aim to limit 
recreational harvest in many fisheries. However these measures are considered 
ineffective in many open access recreational fisheries (Cox et al. 2002; Post et al. 
2003; Morales-Nin et al. 2005). These management measures assume that released 
fish survive, however post-release survival rates are variable between species and 
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often unknown for many species (Post et al. 2003; Sumner 2003; Coleman et al. 2004; 
de Lestang et al. 2004; Thorstad et al. 2004; Bartholomew and Bohnsack 2005). In 
some high-effort recreational fisheries post-release mortality has been found to be high 
(Bohnsack 1993), such as in the walleye fisheries in Alberta, USA (Sullivan 2003 in 
Pereira and Hansen 2003), and the common snook (Centropomus undecimalis) in 
Florida (Muller et al. 2001 in Pereira and Hansen 2003). For the Atlantic striped bass 
(Morone saxatilis) catch-and-release mortality losses were estimated to be 1.2 million 
fish compared to the total recreational landings of 1.4 million fish in 1998. This level of 
mortality, when combined with total commercial fishery losses, led to an overfishing 
declaration for striped bass (NMFS 1999 in Cox et al. 2002). Research suggests that 
all recreational fishing results in some level of injury and stress to an individual fish, 
however, the severity of the injury, magnitude of stress, and potential for mortality 
varies in response to a variety of factors such as fishing gear (e.g., type of hook, bait or 
landing net) and angling practices (e.g., duration of fight and air exposure, fishing 
during extreme environmental conditions, fishing during the reproductive period) 
(Cooke and Sneddon 2007). Bartholomew and Bohnsack (2005) reviewed 53 release 
mortality studies, and found release mortality varied greatly between and within 
species. They listed various important factors that affected mortality, including 
anatomical hooking location (the most important mortality factor), type of bait, removing 
hooks from deeply hooked fish, hook type, depth of capture, warm water temperatures, 
and extended playing and handling times. There is also growing debate regarding the 
ethics of catch-and-release angling in terms of pain and suffering experienced by 
released fish (Cooke and Sneddon 2007).  
 Given these potential impacts, some fisheries departments are becoming 
increasingly concerned about the unmonitored impacts of recreational fishing in 
ROFAs. Unfortunately, when commercial fishers are excluded from an area, the time-
series data provided by commercial catch logbooks is also lost (Hancock 1995; Cowx 
1999; Cox et al. 2002; McPhee et al. 2002; Griffin 2003; Hall 2003; Cooke and Cowx 
2004). Thus, some managers recommend monitoring of recreational catches, 
implementation of limited access within ROFAs, or even allocation of quotas for anglers 
(Sullivan 1997; Cox and Walters 2002; Cox et al. 2002; Anon 2003; Sumner 2003; 
Walters 2003). Fisheries independent monitoring within ROFAs may be required, 
however, as angling alone may not provide the necessary data to accurately assess 
the status of fish stocks (Cowx 1999; Arlinghaus 2005). 
 Other environmental impacts of recreational fishing should also be considered. 
While there are no data available on the environmental impacts of recreational fishing, 
anecdotal evidence outlines problems such as discarded line, lead weights, litter, 
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impacts on habitat through bait harvesting, direct impacts on sea-birds, marine 
mammals and reptiles, and potential trophic or ecosystem effects similar to commercial 
fisheries (Dominion 2002; McPhee et al. 2002; Sumner 2003; Coleman et al. 2004; 
Cooke and Cowx 2004).  
 Implementation of ROFAs may also affect adjacent areas or other species, by 
moving commercial interests from one area or stock to another (Hancock 1995; Bureau 
of Rural Sciences 2003). This was shown in the case of the Florida net ban, where 
commercial fishers previously targeting mullet moved to other species such as stone 
and blue crab which apparently now require increased regulations to protect these 
intensely targeted species. Such action will probably refocus or intensify commercial 
efforts on yet another species as commercial fishers’ families strive to retain their way 
of life (Anderson 1999; Smith et al. 2003). In situations where commercial licences are 
bought-out to implement the ROFA, there is less likelihood of increased pressure on 
remaining areas or other species. 
 Size of ROFAs may also be important, particularly for mobile species, because 
closed areas are less effective for species that have larger home-ranges. Fish that 
settle in a ROFA can be exposed to the commercial fishery if relocations take them 
outside the ROFA boundaries (Kramer and Chapman 1999). 
 
e) Costs to the government: 
Authors such as McPhee and Hundloe (2004) suggest other costs of a new fisheries 
allocation plan to the community should also be considered: i.e. costs of management 
(e.g., legal proceedings and licence buy-backs), compliance, research and education. 
There are expected costs for changing legislation, but additional costs such as buying 
out commercial licences, or paying compensation, can be significant. For example, 114 
commercial licences were initially bought-out as a result of the RAP in the GBRMP at a 
cost of over $31 million (QSIA 2004). Assistance to fishing and related businesses as a 
result of the RAP exceeded $87 million (Campbell 2006). In some instances costs of 
licence buy-outs and compensation for ROFA implementation may be funded by 
recreational fishing licences, such as in NSW, where the creation of 30 ROFAs  
required the purchase of 251 fishing businesses at cost in excess of $18.5 million 
(NSW Department of Primary Industries 2004; Steffe et al. 2005a). 
 Costs of negotiation and legal proceedings can also be significant. While there 
are no exact figures published, the Florida net ban for example was preceded and 
followed by numerous challenges taken to the Supreme Court by conservationists, 
recreational fishers and affected commercial fishers (Renard 1995; Smith et al. 2003). 
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Sutinen and Johnston (2003) state that in the US, litigation costs have increased in 
such a way that resources are diverted from the basic tasks of fisheries management. 
  
 Other studies highlight the need for ongoing public education and stakeholder 
analysis over time, which incur costs but are necessary to ensure the public are aware 
of closures and to allow managers to better-understand any social impacts or benefits 
(Cook and Heinen 2005). 
 
1.2.3 Conclusion 
While many benefits and costs of ROFAs are possible, there are few cases where they 
are examined and quantified, much less compared, to determine whether the benefits 
outweigh the costs involved. Considering the mixed results for both benefits and costs 
outlined above, and with continued pressure from angling bodies to implement more 
ROFAs, potential benefits and costs of current ROFAs should be examined and 
monitored. There is a need for fisheries managers to develop clear management 
objectives for ROFAs, and for investigation into whether these objectives are achieved. 
 The present study focuses on whether benefits of current ROFAs for 
commercial and recreational fishing sectors are being realised within the Queensland 
east coast barramundi fishery. An investigation of costs of current and future ROFAs 
for this fishery is beyond the scope of this study. Information on potential costs 
provided here, however, highlight the importance of examining whether benefits of 
ROFAs are realised, as ROFAs are unlikely to come without costs. 
 
1.3 ROFAs within Queensland east coast estuaries 
Following concern for fish stocks, in 1976 all or part of 6 river systems on Queensland’s 
east-coast were closed to commercial gill net fishing, effectively making them ROFAs 
for finfish (commercial crabbing is still allowed in these areas) (Healy 1995). Later, a 
further approximately 35 estuaries north of Fraser Island were closed or partly closed 
to commercial gill netting. All estuarine ROFAs are listed within Queensland's Fisheries 
Regulations 1995 (see Appendix 1 for a list constructed from the Regulations), 
however information on the timing and reason for each closure is not readily available – 
a number of areas were permanently closed to commercial netting due to their role as 
nursery habitats where fish are in relatively high numbers and can be more susceptible 
to net capture (including inshore seagrass beds, upper reaches of estuaries within 
rivers, and whole estuaries of some smaller creeks) (Zeller and Snape 2005); and an 
unknown number of estuaries were closed to commercial netting in order to reduce 
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conflict between competing recreational and commercial fishers (Mark Doohan, 
QDPI&F, pers. comm., 2005).  
In January 1998, further closures and restrictions to commercial gill netting 
were introduced via the implementation of 17 Dugong Protection Areas (DPAs) on 
Queensland’s east coast. While these areas were set aside specifically for dugong 
conservation, some of these DPAs effectively became ROFAs for finfish (particularly 
barramundi) because set gill netting was banned or restricted. The DPA regulations 
appear complicated when combined with other fisheries regulations. Of most interest to 
this project is the DPA encompassing the Hinchinbrook Channel – due to a 
combination of fisheries regulations and the DPAs, within the Hinchinbrook Channel 
there is a large area (from approximately the Herbert River to just south of Cardwell, 
see Figure 1.2), where no netting is allowed within the channel and adjoining estuaries. 
Adjoining areas allow restricted netting under ‘N1’ and ‘N6’ symbols, with which no 
barramundi are allowed to be kept (there are a number of netting symbols in the East 
Coast Inshore Finfish Fishery – see The commercial fishery below). Other DPAs allow 
restricted netting. The introduction of DPAs resulted in some commercial effort 
displacement from areas where DPA ‘a’ zones were declared to areas where lesser 
restrictive DPA ‘b’ zones were implemented, and to adjacent non-DPA areas (see 
Queensland Department of Primary Industries 1995; Williams 2002a; Zeller and Snape 
2005; Great Barrier Reef Marine Park Authority unknown-a) for further information).  
 More recently (in July 2004) approximately 50 inshore ‘Conservation Park 
(yellow) Zones’ were implemented through the Great Barrier Reef Marine Park 
Authority’s (GBRMPA) ‘Representative Areas Program’ (RAP) (Zeller and Snape 2005; 
Great Barrier Reef Marine Park Authority unknown-b). Many of these yellow zones 
were mirrored within the Great Barrier Reef Coast Marine Park for the low to high tidal 
waters, including part of some rivers (Environmental Protection Agency 2004). Yellow 
zones were implemented with the aim of protecting biodiversity and as such certain 
fishing methods are restricted. Within these zones, line fishing with one line and hook 
per person is allowed, but commercial netting (except baitnetting) is banned (Great 
Barrier Reef Marine Park Authority unknown-b). Hence for inshore areas these yellow 
zones are effectively ROFAs for barramundi at least, for which there is no commercial 
line fishing (Queensland Department of Primary Industries 1995; Department of 
Primary Industries and Fisheries 2004). There are very few estuaries closed to all 
fishing (i.e. both recreational and commercial fishing) in Queensland (Queensland 
Department of Primary Industries 1995; Halliday et al. 2001), however a number of 
bays (not including adjoining estuaries) were closed to all fishing within ‘Marine 
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National Park (green) Zones’ in 2004 via the RAP (Great Barrier Reef Marine Park 
Authority unknown-b). 
 Recreational and commercial estuarine fishers are also separated through time 
segregation: No commercial gill netting is allowed in estuaries on weekends, allowing 
recreational fishers exclusive access at a time when angler activity is highest (Healy 
1995; Queensland Department of Primary Industries 1995). 
 Currently, there are calls for the introduction of further estuarine ROFAs on 
Queensland’s east coast (see The Recreational Fishing Consultative Committee 1994; 
Eussen 2001; Knowles 2001; Sunfish 2001), in an attempt to: a) reduce apparent 
conflict between the commercial and recreational sectors; and b) improve angler 
catches of barramundi (primarily) and other fish species.  
 
1.3.1 ROFAs for barramundi  
While commercial and recreational estuarine fishers share access to most estuarine 
fish species, barramundi (Lates calcarifer), is the main target of commercial gill net 
fishers within the East Coast Inshore Finfish Fishery (ECIFF) in the Great Barrier Reef 
World Heritage Area (GBRWHA), and is one of the most important target fish for 
recreational line fishers in north Queensland (Healy 1995; Welch et al. 2002; CRC Reef 
Research Centre 2005a; Robinson and Cully unknown). Barramundi drive many of the 
calls for further ROFAs and claims of effects of commercial gill net fishing on angler 
catches (see Brayford 1995; Brown 2001). Consequently, barramundi has been 
selected as the focus species of this project. 
 
1.3.2 Goals of ROFAs 
a) Reduction of conflict 
In Queensland, overall recreational fishing participation has declined in recent years 
(Higgs 2003). This decline may be due to a number of factors, however one suggestion 
is that declining recreational fishing participation is often attributed (by anglers) to 
declines in fish stocks and increasing competition with commercial fishers. Regardless 
of this decline in participation, increased access to fishing locations has apparently 
increased contact between the commercial and recreational fishing sectors, which may 
be increasing conflict (Higgs 2003).  
 Overlap in species taken by recreational and commercial fisheries within the 
Queensland ECIFF has created, and will continue to create, conflict over resource 
allocation (Department of Primary Industries and Fisheries 2004). Conflict between 
recreational anglers and commercial gill net fishers over barramundi has been reported 
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in some areas since the 1960s (Griffin 1987a). Currently the presence of such conflict 
is apparent through various media articles, letters to fisheries departments and lobby 
groups, at public meetings and vandalism at boat ramps (see The Recreational Fishing 
Consultative Committee 1994; Eussen 2001; Hansford 2001; Knowles 2001; Sunfish 
2001; Anon 2002a; Olsen 2002). It is unknown, however, whether the majority of the 
general fishing public experiences the conflict. Also, the causes of the conflict have not 
been investigated. Such questions are rarely asked in resource competition situations; 
however their answers will have important implications for possible solutions to conflict, 
including whether ROFAs would be successful in reducing apparent conflict. 
 
b) Improve recreational catches 
Anecdotal claims of improved recreational catches in current ROFAs also frequent 
media articles (see Brown 2001). Concerns over the impact of commercial fishing on 
recreational catch rates in shared areas encourage the push for more ROFAs. For 
example, during the 1993 Queensland Inquiry into recreational fishing, the committee 
was of the view that “prospects for recreational fishers were diminished as a 
consequence of commercial effort being applied to a number of specific areas”. This 
view was based on strong anecdotal evidence presented at public meetings and within 
a number of submissions (48% of 4085 submissions) that expressed concern about 
commercial gill netting in Queensland estuaries. The committee subsequently 
recommended the introduction of more estuarine ROFAs, particularly near population 
centres (The Recreational Fishing Consultative Committee 1994).  
 There is currently no scientific information, however, to support or refute claims 
of the effect of commercial fishing on angler catches and improved angler catches in 
Queensland estuarine ROFAs. Recreational catch data for barramundi are limited to 
state-wide surveys (see Higgs 1997; Higgs 2001; Henry 2003), with insufficient detail at 
the small-scale to allow comparisons of catches between specific estuaries. Such lack 
of information is common where ROFAs have been introduced.  
 
It is unknown whether opinions portrayed in the media and via submissions are 
representative of the general fishing public, although it is often assumed by fisheries 
managers that they are, These generally negative opinions, however, may be held only 
by a vocal minority group that apparently consist either of those peripherally engaged 
in fishing or those within organised fishing groups. Hence, the degree to which 
statements found in the media are representative is unclear. Because such opinions 
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can influence management decisions, their representativeness should be investigated 
(Beaumariage 1978; Henry 1984; Pender 1995; Smith and Pollard 1995). 
 
1.3.3 Available data for Queensland estuarine ROFAs 
Halliday et al. (2001), using commercial gill net techniques, examined the abundance 
of barramundi and other species in north Queensland estuaries open and closed (i.e. 
ROFAs) to commercial gill net fishing through the Effects of Net Fishing (EoNF) 
Project. They found significantly fewer large (>800 mm total length (TL)) barramundi in 
estuaries open to commercial gill netting (‘open’ estuaries) than in the ROFAs. 
Barramundi ranging from 600-800 mm TL were commonly caught at all sites. Their 
study supported the notion that ROFAs could benefit the recreational fishery in terms of 
improving catches of large barramundi. They noted, however, that the lower 
abundances of large legal barramundi in open systems might also be due to 
unquantified recreational fishing pressure. For interest, the study also found no 
significant differences in the abundance of other species between estuaries open and 
closed to commercial gill netting. 
 While the EoNF Project did find higher abundances of larger barramundi in 
estuarine ROFAs than in open estuaries, suggesting this may translate into improved 
angler catches, it is unknown whether this will occur – some studies suggest it may not 
because angling success is often highly variable (see Ruello and Henry 1977; Johnson 
and Carpenter 1994; Anderson 1999; Griffin 2003). 
 
1.4 Objectives of Project 
The overall aim of the current project is to examine the effectiveness of north 
Queensland estuarine finfish ROFAs in: a) resolving apparent resource competition 
and conflict between recreational and commercial fishers in north Queensland 
estuaries, and b) improving recreational catch quality for barramundi in north 
Queensland estuaries. To achieve these aims, the specific objectives are: 
 
1. To explore the nature and source of apparent competition and conflict between 
recreational line and commercial gill net fishers in north Queensland; 
2. To examine whether fishers support the current and future use of estuarine 
finfish ROFAs to reduce conflict between the two sectors; 
3. To determine if there is a difference in recreational line fishing quality between 




The impartial data obtained will be provided to all Queensland fisheries stakeholders 
and managers, in an attempt to reduce or resolve potential resource competition and 
conflict regarding barramundi. Data from this case study may be relevant to other 
situations where resource competition and conflict is present. 
 
1.5 Study Area 
The study area, within north Queensland (see Figure 1.1 for the location of the study 
area within Australia) includes all estuaries between the Murray River (north of 
Cardwell), south to Cape Upstart (south of Ayr) (Figure 1.2). The residential area of 
interest is Cardwell south to Ayr. This area was chosen due to proximity to Townsville 
and was considered a manageable area to study for a PhD project. Approximately 11 
estuaries within the study area have been partly or completely closed to commercial gill 
net fishing for many years prior to commencement of the study – the exact date 
specific closures were implemented is unknown but is between four (prior to DPA 
implementation) and 25 years – Information about timing of closures is available only in 
archives (to which I was unable to gain access) at QDPI&F, reflecting the ad hoc 
nature with which these closures were implemented. Regardless, the closure periods 
are considered long enough to notice potential improvements in recreational catches 
for barramundi which typically recruit to the commercial fishery at about 3 years of age 
(Williams 2002a). Further gill net closures are encompassed by the DPA of the 
Hinchinbrook Channel (including all adjoining estuaries) which was implemented in 
January 1998. Other DPAs within the study area  restrict netting only in the 
encompassed bays, not including adjoining rivers. There are differences between each 
DPA zone: DPA ‘a’ zones have stricter netting controls than DPA ‘b’ zones. In DPAa 
zones, the use of offshore set, foreshore set and drift nets are prohibited, but river set 
nets are allowed with modifications except in the Hinchinbrook Channel. In DPAb 
zones, mesh netting practices are allowed to continue, but with more rigorous 
safeguards and restrictions than prior to DPA implementation (Zeller and Snape 2005; 
Great Barrier Reef Marine Park Authority unknown-a).  
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Figure 1.1 Map outlining the study area within Queensland, Australia. 
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Figure 1.2 Map of study area in north Queensland outlining ROFA and part-ROFA 
estuaries and Dugong Protection Areas (DPAs). 
 
1.6 The Barramundi fishery 
1.6.1 Barramundi biology  
The barramundi (Lates calcarifer (Bloch)) is a predatory centropomid perch, generally 
found in freshwater, estuarine and coastal habitats (Dunstan 1959; Russell and Garrett 
1983; Davis and Kirkwood 1984; Russell and Garrett 1985; Garrett 1987; Russell and 
Garrett 1988; Welch et al. 2002). Recreational and commercial fishers compete for 
shared stocks of barramundi in bays and estuaries (i.e. tidal waters of coastal rivers 
(Coastal Engineering Research Center 1984)) – netting is not allowed in non-tidal 
waters (Queensland Department of Primary Industries 1995).  
 In Australia, barramundi are found from southern Queensland, north to the 
central coast of Western Australia (Dunstan 1959; Shaklee and Salini 1985). In 
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Queensland, this protandrous hermaphrodite matures as a male between 45 and 75 
cm total length (TL) (4-5 years of age), then changes sex between 55 and 95 cm TL 
(usually 7-8 years of age). Female barramundi can live for more than 30 years and 
reach 1.5 m TL and 60 kg body weight. They recruit to the commercial fishery after 
approximately 3-5 years (typically 3 years on Queensland’s east coast), sometimes still 
sexually immature (Dunstan 1959; Garrett 1987; Department of Primary Industries and 
Fisheries 2001; Welch et al. 2002; Williams 2002a).  
 Barramundi are highly fecund, and spawning aggregations occur just before the 
onset of the wet season at estuary mouths. Juveniles subsequently take advantage of 
the aquatic habitat that results from flooding (Dunstan 1959; Russell and Garrett 1983, 
1985; Davis 1987; Russell and Garrett 1988; Griffin and Walters 1999; Halliday et al. 
2001; Welch et al. 2002; Williams 2002a). In some localities the severity of the wet 
season determines the number of spawners available, and the amount and timing of 
rainfall affects the amount of freshwater habitat available for coastal wetland nursery 
areas (Dunstan 1959). Positive relationships have been found between the amount of 
freshwater flow and barramundi year-class strength (Staunton-Smith et al. 2004).  
 
1.6.2 The Barramundi Fishery 
Catches of barramundi by the commercial and recreational fishing sectors on 
Queensland’s east coast have been comparable (Zeller and Snape 2005): In 1999, 204 
commercial boats reported a harvest of 211 t in tidal waters, and Queensland’s 
Department of Primary Industries and Fisheries (QDPI&F) bi-annual recreational 
fishing monitoring program (known as ‘RFISH’) reported a harvest of about 270 t of 
barramundi by Queensland anglers (non-Queensland anglers were not surveyed) in 
tidal and non-tidal waters (Williams 2002a). Both of these harvest estimates were 
reduced in 2002, particularly for the recreational sector: In 2002 172 commercial boats 
harvested 197 t of barramundi (Department of Primary Industries 2002)), while the 
recreational sector harvested 96 t (Higgs, QDPI&F, unpublished data) on Queensland’s 
east coast.  
 QDPI&F’s RFISH surveys estimated approximately 22 400 Queensland anglers 
targeted barramundi at least once a year in 2002, although the proportion of anglers 
targeting barramundi (33.5% of anglers) is higher in north Queensland than in other 
parts of the state (Higgs and McInnes 2003).   
Indigenous fishers also capture barramundi, using lines, nets, spears and traps 
(Williams 2002a), however their barramundi catch is relatively small (5.7 t per annum in 
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Queensland in 2000/01 (Henry 2003)), and potential competition with the indigenous 
sector is not considered within this project. 
 Size restrictions apply to both the recreational and commercial sectors, with a 
minimum legal size of 580 mm total length (TL) and a maximum legal size of 1200 mm 
TL (to protect large females). A closed season to protect spawning stock applies from 
the 1st of November to the 1st of February each year on the east-coast of Queensland 
(Healy 1995; 1995; Halliday et al. 2001; Welch et al. 2002; Williams 2002a).  
 
a) The commercial fishery 
Barramundi is targeted commercially in Queensland in the Gulf of Carpentaria and on 
the east-coast: there are separate management plans for these two areas (Williams 
2002a). The East Coast Inshore Finfish Fishery (ECIFF), the focus of this project, 
operates along the length of Queensland’s east coast, though barramundi are 
harvested  northward from Baffle Creek (240 30’S) to Cape York (Zeller and Snape 
2005), (see Figure 1.1). The ECIFF, mainly comprising small, owner operated family 
businesses (Fenton and Marshall 2001), is a multi-species fishery where operators 
target a range of finfish species using a variety of net methods under N1-N8 and K1-K8 
symbols (Healy 1995; Welch et al. 2002; Zeller and Snape 2005). Barramundi fishers 
are licensed with an ‘N2’ symbol (East Coast Set Net Fishery), though many east coast 
net fishers are mixed gear fishers with a number of licence symbols which they use 
when inshore finfish catches or market demand are low (Zeller and Snape 2005). The 
N2 fishery operates in all Queensland tidal waters east of longitude 142º09' east, but 
does not include waterways flowing into the Gulf of Carpentaria west of longitude 
142º09' east (Queensland Department of Primary Industries 1995). On the east coast, 
the mean number of days spent fishing for barramundi per boat per year is about 25 
days (varying from 50 days in Far North Queensland, to around 8 days in the Fraser 
Island Region) (Williams 2002a). 
 Commercial gill net licences were restricted in 1981, and since 1986, 272 
licences were authorised to operate in the N2 fishery (Healy 1995), of which about 250 
reported catch each year to the year 2000 (Williams 2002a). From the entire ECIFF 
(i.e. not only N2 licences), 38 licences were bought out during the implementation of 
measures to protect the dugong in 1997, 56 were bought out with the RAP restructure 
in 2004, and the latent effort policy in 2004/5 reduced the remaining licences by 40%. 
Following these buy-outs, 189 N2 licences remain (Mark Doohan, QDPI&F, pers. 
comm., 2005; Zeller and Snape 2005).  
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 A gill net is a wall of netting which entangles finfish by their gills and other hard 
structures such as spines and fins. A gill net is fixed at both ends, often with one end 
tied to the bank of a river, and the other anchored. Set gill nets fish “passively”: i.e. fish 
must swim past the gear to be caught. The top of the net has floats attached and the 
bottom, with weights attached, sinks to the substrate forming a wall of mesh (Anderson 
1999; Millar and Fryer 1999). Gill netting is considered a highly selective method of 
fishing with the ability to capture mostly targeted species: not all finfish species are 
susceptible to set gill nets due to their size, shape or behaviour (Russell and Garrett 
1985; Petrakis and Stergiou 1996; Millar and Fryer 1999; Halliday et al. 2001; Gray 
2002). Gill nets are also size selective for barramundi – Halliday et al. (2001) found 
catches of undersize fish in 150 mm mesh size nets were low, with less than 9% of the 
barramundi catch being under legal size, and large barramundi are capable of forcing 
their way through nets using the razor-sharp edges of their operculum (Department of 
Primary Industries and Fisheries 2001). Gill net selectivity is also a dependent on water 
clarity, net colour and hanging ratio, habitat, water currents, etc (Petrakis and Stergiou 
1996; Gray 2002). The east coast set net fishery is restricted in rivers and estuaries to 
a prescribed net type (monofilament), length (3 nets totalling no more than 360 m in 
length), and mesh size (between 150 and 215 mm). These net restrictions differ slightly 
in foreshore areas where species other than barramundi are also targeted. Fishing 
predominantly occurs at night, with soak times varying between 2 and 6 hours. Most 
fishing effort occurs close to regional population centres (Zeller and Snape 2005). 
  
b) The recreational fishery 
The recreational barramundi fishery represents a multi-million dollar tourist industry in 
Queensland, including a private and charter sector, although exact estimates of value 
are unknown (Welch et al. 2002; Robinson and Cully unknown). There was an increase 
in recreational effort in the 1970s, mostly attributable to improved mobility and greater 
access to fishing areas (Healy 1995). Barramundi are caught using hook and line, with 
anglers restricted to a bag limit of 5 barramundi per person. Historic information on 
recreational catch is limited; however QDPI&F's RFISH surveys have been collecting 
catch information bi-annually through an extensive recreational fisher diary program 
since 1997 (Higgs 1997, 2001; Williams 2002a). As stated above, RFISH estimated the 
recreational sector harvested approximately 96 t on Queensland’s east coast in 2002 
(Higgs, QDPI&F, unpublished data). Approximately 22 400 Queensland anglers 
targeted barramundi at least once a year in 2002, although the proportion of anglers 
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targeting barramundi (33.5% of anglers) is higher in north Queensland than in other 
parts of the state (Higgs and McInnes 2003).   
 
1.6.3 Threats to the resource 
CPUE trends for the commercial fishery, showing a steady increase from 1981 to 2001, 
suggest current effort levels are not threatening to the stock. There was a slight 
downturn in biomass estimates on the east coast from 1999-2001, however this may 
be due to management changes introduced in 1998-9 (i.e. DPA introductions and 
associated licence reductions) (Welch et al. 2002). Other papers suggest the 
recreational catch needs to be incorporated into future fishery assessments before 
conclusions are drawn regarding resource sustainability (Williams 2002a). 
 Another concern for barramundi stocks that has been listed is the loss of 
habitat, particularly for juvenile fish, through urban and rural development and other 
land uses (Garrett 1987; Russell 1987; Williams 2002a). Coastal wetland nursery 
habitats appear critical to the life cycle of barramundi (Moore 1982; Russell and Garrett 
1983; Davis 1985) and their destruction could lead to a decline in barramundi stocks 
(Russell and Garrett 1985; Russell 1987). 
 
1.7 Chapter Outline 
The perceptions of a representative sample of recreational and commercial estuarine 
fishers within the study area were examined via a questionnaire program, outlined in 
Chapter 2. The questionnaire program examined whether competition and conflict 
between the two sectors is an issue for the general fishing public, and what the nature 
and source of the conflict might be. Respondents were asked: how they view their own 
and the competing sectors’ impacts on estuarine fisheries resources (relating to blame 
theory); how they think apparent conflict might be resolved; their knowledge of current 
ROFAs and support of future ROFAs; and whether they think ROFAs result in 
improved angler catches for barramundi. 
 Chapter 3: “Fishery-dependent recreational catch data” provides a comparison 
of current recreational catch trends between estuaries open and closed (ROFA) to 
commercial gill net fishing. The fishery-dependent data sources are: 1) three years of 
charter fishing records from compulsory QDPI&F logbooks for the study area; 2) a 2-
year voluntary recreational catch logbook program, which recorded anglers’ catch 
information including estuary, time of day and time spent fishing, number of fishers, 
methods, target species and catch (including species, length and fate); and 3) time 
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series recreational catch data for the Hinchinbrook region from a group of fishers from 
the Australian National Sportsfishing Association (ANSA). 
 The results from the fishery-dependent data sources, which provide variable 
data, were verified through a more statistically valid fishery-independent structured 
fishing survey program, outlined in Chapter 4. The structured surveys sampled six 
randomly chosen estuaries within the study area (3 ‘open’ and 3 ROFA estuaries); 
similar to the design used for the EoNF project outlined above. The surveys used 
recreational line fishing techniques to test whether the EoNF project results translate 
into improved line catches in estuarine finfish ROFAs.  
 Each of these chapters are tied together as a general discussion in Chapter 5, 
providing an overview of whether competition and conflict within estuaries is an issue 
within the north Queensland fishing community as a whole; from where such conflict 
might originate; and therefore whether further ROFAs are appropriate to resolve this 
conflict. Other potential solutions to conflict are discussed. The general discussion also 
includes whether improved recreational catch rates in finfish ROFAs are real or 
perceived and what this may mean for future ROFAs and research needs. 
